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Abstract
In this work I attempt to justify the claim that the discovery of 
statistically relevant brain correlates of consciousness 
supports Non-Reductive Physicalism. First I distinguish the 
main varieties of Reductive and Non-Reductive Physicalism, 
selecting the right one that is benefited by progress in brain 
sciences. Second, I discuss epistemological problems in the 
search of brain correlates of consciousness, focusing on the 
simultaneous occurrence of conscious activity, known by 
means of subjective report, and the corresponding brain 
activity, registered with the help of technology. Finally, I argue 
– using Salmon´s concept of Statistical Explanation - that 
statistics affords a distinction of causal (physical) from casual 
(illusory) correlations.
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Varieties of Reductive Physicalism
• In Reductive Physicalism, the reduced theory is Psychology 
(both folk and scientific). The difference between the reductive 
varieties lies in the proposed explanans:
• A) for Micro-Reductionists, psychological properties are going 
to be explained in terms of micro/molecular entities and their 
relations, e.g. by means of the interaction of biological 
molecules with receptor proteins;
• B) for Math-Reductionists, psychological properties are going 
to be explained by models of Mathematical Physics, e.g. 
Dynamical Systems Theory;
• C) for Fundamentalists, psychological properties are going to 
be explained by fundamental physical theories, as quantum and 
string theories, e.g. conscious states considered as quantum 
coherent conformations of neuronal microtubules.
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Ontological NRP
• The term ‘Physicalism’ can be interpreted relatively to one area 
of science – Physics – or to the whole of science.
• In the first case, NRP is an (ontological) hypothesis that 
everything that is real and can be known is physical, but such a 
physical reality has levels that cannot be reduced to other 
levels. 
• In this view, “physical” means all that has matter, energy, 
information or any combination of them (IOW, all that is in 
accord to what contemporary Physics considers as necessary 
to produce a physical phenomenon, i.e., a phenomenon that 
can be studied by the methods of Physics). 
• This ontological formulation of NRP  is metaphysical; the levels 
of reality are not conceived as dependent on methods of 
construction of knowledge.
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Interdisciplinary NRP
• A second class of NRP is one that takes into account the 
method by which we come to know the physical world. The 
resulting ‘Interdisciplinary Physicalism’ includes other 
sciences besides Physics. It has two variants:
A) Epistemological NRIP (or Pluralism) postulates an 
irreducible plurality of methods for the study psychological 
phenomena. The resulting different views of physical reality 
are conceived as determined by the methods;
B) Pragmatic NRIP postulates that the choice of methods is 
ultimately pragmatic, and therefore different views can be 
made compatible when convenient. In scientific practice 
(i.e., ‘a posteriori’), the existence of statistically meaningful 
correlations between phenomena indicates that they belong 
to the same physical reality.
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Contrastive Methods in 
Consciousness Research
• One strategy to identify brain patterns that support 
conscious processing is to contrast brain activity in the 
presence and absence of a reported conscious content 
(the “contrastive method” described by Baars, 1997). 
• A similar strategy is often used in fMRI studies in 
Cognitive Neuroscience. The “subtraction” operation 
consists of literally subtracting measured values of 
unconscious activity from registers of conscious 
activities. The result of the subtraction operation is 
regarded as the neural correlate of the reported 
conscious content.
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The Problem of Underdetermination
• a) Given a stimulus, in masked and non-masked conditions, the 
non-masked condition causes conscious perception C at time t;
• b) Scientists subtract one from the other to find the brain 
pattern P of activity that corresponds to C;
• c) The experimenter knows that C occurs to the experimental 
subject only by means of a report that occurs at time t';
• d) At time t', it is a (short-term) memory trace of C (supposedly 
related to P) that is reported;
• e) Even if the report is collected as close as possible to the 
occurrence of C, its relation with P remains underdetermined, 
since reporting requires complex brain operations; 
• f) There is no way to determine (in the millisecond scale) when 
C occurred and therefore it is not possible deduce that P 
causes C.
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Probabilistic Causation
• A set of causes may be neither necessary nor sufficient, 
but "support" or contribute for the effects. This situation, 
that is frequent in the context of biological and human 
sciences, can be described in terms of the presence of the 
causes increasing the probability of the effects. A classical 
example is the statement "smoking causes cancer". 
Smoking is not sufficient for cancer, since many smokers 
fortunately do not develop that disease. It is not necessary, 
since many cancer patients did not smoke. It is not an 
accidental correlation either, since the connection between 
smoking an having cancer has been shown to be 
statistically meaningful.  Smoking is a factor that has an 
influence on the putative mechanisms of cancer 
generation, contributing but not determining its occurrence.
N
a
t
u
r
e
 
P
r
e
c
e
d
i
n
g
s
 
:
 
d
o
i
:
1
0
.
1
0
3
8
/
n
p
r
e
.
2
0
1
2
.
6
9
6
9
.
1
 
:
 
P
o
s
t
e
d
 
6
 
M
a
r
 
2
0
1
2
Probabilistic Explanation
• Given the underdetermination of hypotheses by available 
data, the deduction of conscious phenomena from brain 
activity is not feasible, but a probabilistic explanation is 
possible;
• In scientific experimental settings, statistical tests are 
used to assure the significance of the connection of 
causes and effects, allowing the distinction of casual (or 
accidental), and causal relations. 
• Statistically meaningful correlations can afford a causal - 
although not a deductive/reductive - explanation of 
mental phenomena from its physical correlates.N
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Dual-Aspect Monism
• The occurrence of brain widespread high-frequency 
synchrony following the presentation of a visual stimulus is a 
factor that significantly increases the probability of the 
stimulus being consciously perceived. 
• In the so-called "Mind-Reading" paradigm (Kamitami and 
Tong, 2005, Haynes and Rees, 2006), fMRI is used to predict 
(with high probability) conscious content based on differential 
activation of brain areas. 
• The high degree of correlation between kinds of brain activity 
and conscious processes suggest that, although displaying 
different modes of appearance to the scientific observer, they 
are ultimately aspects of the same underlying reality (Dual- 
Aspect Monism, which is in this regard equivalent to NRIP).
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Concluding Remarks
• The impossibility of deducing the effects (conscious processes) 
from the causes (brain activity) counts against a Reductionist 
interpretation of neuroscientific results. The question that 
remains is if the difference between both is the result of an 
absolute methodological divide, an interpretation that would 
lead to property dualism or pluralism. However, these positions 
do not account for strong correlations of physical and mental 
events. 
• Therefore, the conclusion to be drawn is that physical and 
mental properties, although appearing as different to the human 
observer, do not belong to different domains of reality.  This 
conclusion is better fit by Pragmatic NRP, because this position 
is not attached to metaphysical preconceptions about the 
structure of reality, being open to new ontological implications 
derived from scientific discoveries and theoretical models.
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